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ABSTRACT
Modeling COVID-19 Spread Using an Agent-Based Network
Stephen Hung
Beginning in 2019 and quickly spreading internationally, the Coronavirus disease
Covid-19 became the first pandemic that many people have witnessed firsthand along
with the severe disruption to their daily lives. A key field of research for Covid-19 that
is studied by epidemiologists, biologists, and computer scientists alike is modeling the
spread of Covid-19 in order to better predict future outbreaks of the pandemic and
evaluate potential strategies to reduce infections, hospitalizations, and deaths.
This thesis proposes a method of modeling Covid-19 spread and interventions for
local environments based on different levels of perspective. The goal for this thesis is
to be able to present a model of Covid-19 in terms of surrounding areas in San Luis
Obispo including the unique mobility dynamic currently held in the global pandemic.
Furthermore, we use our model to explore different methods of ensuring a low infection
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Covid-19 began in December of 2019 when the Wuhan Municipal Health Com-
mission in China reported cases of pneumonia from unknown causes to the World
Health Organization (WHO) [38]. Beginning in January 2020, the Wuhan Province
fell under quarantine and cases of the new novel coronavirus, Covid-19, were con-
firmed internationally in the United States, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. By February
2020, many more countries such as India, Italy, the United Kingdom, and more con-
firmed their first cases of Covid-19 and initiated travel bans to and from China. By
the end of February, 56 countries confirmed approximately 84,000 cases and 2,874
cases were reported globally [29]. By March 11 2020, the WHO officially character-
ized Covid-19 as a pandemic which is defined as ”an outbreak of a disease that occurs
over a wide geographic area (such as multiple countries or continents) and typically
affects a significant proportion of the population” by the Merriam-Webster dictionary
[2][36]. In the coming months, countries started instating quarantine measures, all
residents were ordered to stay at home, country borders were sealed, in-person schools
were closed, and many businesses had to shut down.
However even as many people’s daily lives grinded to a halt, scientists, doctors, and
many researchers banded together to start analyzing Covid-19’s genetic code in or-
der to develop treatments, vaccines, and a deeper understanding of the coronavirus’
structure. In a parallel process, researchers from all around the world and from fields
ranging from mathematics to epidemiology began researching the spread of Covid-19.
They developed models to understand the spread of Covid-19 and help inform poli-
cies that governments or businesses would develop. These models included modelling
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interventions methods and methods to reduce the hospitalization rate of individu-
als. As part of the modelling, researchers explored many different factors that were
not present in previous pandemics. My thesis focuses on the modelling of such fac-
tors in an agent-based contact network for San Luis Obispo specifically and explores




Infectious diseases have been present in mankind’s history for almost as long as our
written history. Signs of rabies, a disease that still exists today, were present back
in 2300 B.C. where Babylonian laws dictated that if a dog transmitted rabies, the
owner would have to pay a fine [21]. In comparison to the age of infectious diseases,
the study of infectious diseases and their spread is a relatively younger field. John
Graunt is regarded as one of the first epidemiologists, scientists who study infectious
diseases, when he published the 1662 book ”Natural and Political Observations made
upon the Bills of Mortality” which related human diseases and the ensuing deaths
[15]. The foundation for modern infectious disease models can be drawn from the
Kermack–McKendrick & Reed–Frost epidemic models which emerged in the 1920s
and related susceptible, infected, and immune (recovered) population models [30][3].
Kermack-McKendrick’s model was able to predict epidemic behavior similar to pre-
viously recorded epidemics and is the foundation for what will come to be known as
a compartmental model.
2.1 Coronaviruses
Although Covid-19 is often referred to as ”the coronavirus” colloquially, Covid-19
is in fact only one of many coronaviruses [44]. The coronavirus that is causing the
current pandemic, Covid-19, is known as SARS-CoV-2 which stands for Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 and is the second virus very similar to SARS
[8]. SARS is a disease caused by the coronavirus SARS-CoV-1 which resulted in the
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2002-2004 SARS outbreak. In comparison to Covid-19, SARS was relatively smaller
in scope as it infected a total of 8,422 individuals with a fatality rate of 11% by
the end of the epidemic. Both disease share very similar symptoms such as fever,
headaches, and respiratory symptoms like coughing.
Coronaviruses are a family of viruses that are commonly seen in birds and mammals
with differing effects [33]. Coronaviruses are named as such because the virus’ outer
surface has short spiky protrusions similar to a crown (translated to corona in Latin).
Coronaviruses contain spike proteins which allow the virus to penetrate certain cells
in the body and offload its’ viral load thereby turning the infected cell into a virus
producing cell. Originally coronaviruses were native to animals but over time evolved
to infect humans too. SARS for instance was found to occur from civets while MERS
was found to be from camels. While Covid-19’s animal precursor has not been found
yet, bats have been identified as one of the possible precursors to an intermediate
carrier which then infected humans. Coronaviruses are also not a relatively new
occurrence as the first human coronavirus was identified in the mid-1960s [9]. There
are four common strains of coronaviruses which cause the common cold in human
individuals. These four common strains are referred to as:
• 229E (alpha coronavirus)
• NL63 (alpha coronavirus)
• OC43 (beta coronavirus)
• HKU1 (beta coronavirus)
229E and OC43 have been found to account for 4-15% of colds annually and a maxi-
mum of 35% during peak seasons [40].
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Similarities among the coronavirus family includes the high infectiousness and rel-
atively lower fatality rate. SARS had a mortality rate of about 9.6%, Covid-19 is
estimated at 2%, and MERS between 30-40%.
In general, coronaviruses are spread by respiratory droplets caused by infected in-
dividuals breathing, coughing, or sneezing. Upon infection, human individuals may
display mild to severe symptoms similar to a flu but exact symptoms are dependent
on the coronavirus.
Coronaviruses can be diagnosed by analyzing blood and respiratory samples. As
with colds, there are no treatments that can completely cure the coronavirus and thus
individuals usually recover on their own. Vaccines are effective in reducing the spread
of coronaviruses. For Covid-19, the first vaccines began rolling out in December of
2020 and will continue throughout 2021 [37].
2.2 Compartmental Models
Compartmental models are mathematical models where the population in the model
is split into different labelled compartments. In Kermack-McKendrick’s case the
compartments were labeled as SIR which stand for
• Susceptible: Individuals who can catch the disease
• Infected: Individuals who currently have the disease and can transmit it
• Recovered/Removed: Individuals who have had the disease and are now immune
to it (Individuals that pass away as a result of the disease may also fall into this
category as ”Removed”)
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Figure 2.1: Flow of the SIR compartmental model [43]
The order of the labels usually dictates the linear flow of the population so in this
case the population flows from Susceptible to Infected and finally to Recovered. This
can be seen in Figure 2.1. In order to transition from one compartment to another,
differential equations with respect to time are used to represent each compartment.
The reason why these equations are with respect to time is because these epidemic
models are used to represent the change in epidemic spread over time. An example












− γI, I(0) = I0 ≥ 0
dR
dt
= γI, R(0) = R0 ≥ 0
Where S, I, and R are shortform for S(t), I(t), R(t) which stands for their respective
populations at time t. Given a population N , S(t)+I(t)+R(t) = N . β is the contact
rate between individuals and 1
γ
is the average infectious period. γI has been shown
to correspond to P (t) = e−γt which is the fraction of individuals in the Infective







, S(0) = S0 ≥ 0
The differential equation for the Susceptible population states that the change in
population is the proportion of susceptible individuals coming into contact with in-
fected individuals. As the transitions between compartments are linear, any changes
in the Susceptible population are a result of individuals transferring to the Infected
population. A requirement is that the starting Susceptible population must be ≥ 0






− γI, I(0) = I0 ≥ 0
The change in infected individuals is the number of newly transferred individuals from
the Susceptible compartment minus any individuals who have already recovered. As
defined earlier, γI is equivalent to the number of infected individuals past a certain
time period, who can be called ”recovered” or ”removed”.
dR
dt
= γI, R(0) = R0 ≥ 0
The change in recovered individuals is simply the number of infected individuals who
cross the average infectious period and thus are either dead or recovered.
Beyond the basic SIR model detailed in Kermack-McKendrick’s theory, there exists a
wide range of models specifically for different cases. For instance, in the SIR model,
deceased individuals are treated the same as recovered but in the SIRD model they
are seperated into another compartment. Furthermore some diseases such as measles
can lead to maternally-derived immunity when babies are born and achieve immunity
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due to antibodies passed through the placenta. This gives rise to the MSIR model
where M stands for ”maternally derived immunity” and SIR is the same as before.
Another compartmental model that is relatively common is the SEIR model where
E stands for Exposed individuals. The difference between the SEIR model and the
simple SIR model is that diseases may have an incubation period where individuals
have been infected but cannot transmit the disease yet. Thus, these individuals are
placed in the Exposed compartment.
2.3 Agent-Based Models
Agent-based models, also known as ABMs, are a relatively recent type of simulation
models which allow for computational approaches in simulating infectious diseases.
One of the first ABMs was published in 1996 by Joshua Epstein and Robert Axtell
[20]. The model consists of a population of agents, each with their own pre-determined
characteristics, that undergo a simulation of interactions in an environment according
to a set of rules [47]. ABMs do not have a strict definition of agents as agents
can portray any kind of populations such as individuals or households. An agent’s
characteristics can include features such as health status or demographics for an
individual agent. Although there are certain rules dictating the actions that agents
can take, ABMs are non-deterministic (stochastic) as innate randomness in the model
allows for varied population changes. In the case of epidemiology, agents can be
inserted into a social network where rules dictate agent interactions in the network
and their reactions to infectious diseases [19].
In comparison to compartmental models, ABMs allow for a greater range of indi-
vidualized factors and more complex interactions which in turn produces more ob-
servations into reactions from individual agents and the population as a whole. For
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instance some compartmental models such as Kermack-McKendrick’s SIR model as-
sume a well-mixed population where individuals have equal chances of contacting
infected individuals and thus cannot account for the complex social interactions in-
herent in a pandemic situation. Although there have been efforts to create compart-
mental models that can take into account varying levels of social mixing, they cannot
represent contacts between distinct individuals [45].
Because of their effectiveness in modelling infectious diseases and reactions to inter-
ventions, ABMs have been used by a large range of institutions such as the CDC and
John Hopkins Medical School for prior infectious diseases [39].
2.4 Contact Networks
As mentioned in previous sections, modelling the contacts between distinct individ-
uals is a difficult task that is very important for realistic representations of human
populations. A contact network aims to make this task easier by containing infor-
mation about contacts between individuals such as location, frequency, and duration
of contacts [12]. Furthermore, contact networks can contain important information
about communities such as relevant social circles for individuals. Thanks to techno-
logical advances, observations can be made in a real-life environment by using GPS
and Bluetooth. Contact networks are not necessarily only used for epidemiological
studies as they are useful for studying and modelling human social networks. An
example of a contact network is the Copenhagen Network which was collected by
researchers studying approximately 700 university students over one academic year
[42]. The researchers used Bluetooth to identify physical proximity, phone call, text
message, and Facebook networks to identify communication networks. An example of
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the Copenhagen’s Bluetooth contact network over a span of 40 minutes can be seen
in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: A visualization of Bluetooth networksin the Copenhagen Net-
work over time [42]
As seen in the Copenhagen Network, not all data is relevant to modelling the spread
of an infectious disease; however, data about physical contact and its duration is espe-
cially helpful in identifying meaningful contact and its frequency among individuals.
2.5 Epidemic Parameters
Part of the goal of these disease models is to provide a prediction of how an epidemic
spread will occur. In order to measure the spread of an epidemic and the effects of the
epidemic spread, there exist several calculated epidemic parameters. As researchers
use epidemic models to model different interventions, these parameters are important
for predicting the effects of such interventions.
2.5.1 R0, The Basic Reproduction Number
R0 is commonly known as the basic reproductive number and refers to the average
number of infections that an infected individual will cause. It is commonly used to
analyze how contagious an infectious disease is. For example a R0 = 3 means that the
average individual will infect 3 other non-infected individuals. R0 is a non-negative
real number that has two important delineations for possible values:
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• Case 1 (R0 < 1) : If R0 is less than one then that means, on average, an
infected individual will infect less than one other person and the infectious
disease will eventually die out as the infected population is unable to sustain
itself.
• Case 2 (R0 ≥ 1) : If R0 is greater than or equal to one, this means that on
average an infected individual will infect at least one other individual and the
disease will be able to sustain itself and stay stable or become widespread.
The R0 is influenced by 3 factors: the disease’s infectious period, the average contact
rate, and the mode of transmission. This is due to the fact that the longer a disease
is infectious, the more likely an infected individual will infect other individuals. The
higher the average contact rate, the more chances that an infected individual can
infect others. The mode of transmission is especially important since diseases that
are air-transmitted are easily transmitted compared to diseases such as HIV which
are transmitted via bodily fluids. Thus, the R0 could be represented as such:
R0 = τ · c̄ · d
Where τ is the probability of infection between a susceptible individual and an infected
individual (given contact), c̄ is the average contract rate for infected individuals, and




3.1 Prior Pandemic Studies
The study of how pandemics spread and intervention methods to curtail a vast spread
has been studied by many researchers in the past.
In 2008, Davey and Glass published a paper about community mitigation strategies
for the Influenza Pandemic [16]. The authors used a networked agent-based com-
putational model, Loki-Infect, and child sequestering & all-community sequestering
methods. Child sequestering is the strategy of keeping children and teenagers 18
years and younger at home. All-community sequestering is similar except with all
community members. Similar to the compartments in a compartmental model, in-
dividuals could be given one of seven classifications (uninfected, latently infected,
infected presymptomatic, infected symptomatic, infected asymptomatic, immune, or
dead). The Loki-Infect model selects transmission opportunities stochastically and
can be tuned based on hyperparameters such as infectivity of the virus, susceptibil-
ity of individual, and infectiousness of transmitting persons. They found that child
sequestering by itself did not control the epidemic enough and required community
sequestering to meet the goal of reducing infection rates. Upon reaching a threshold
for reduced infection rates, they found that triggering restrictions again upon reach-
ing 10-cases was very effective in flattening the infection rate. One key note they
noticed was that compliance to epidemic strategies was vitally important, otherwise
having stricter thresholds could still lead to the opposite effect where a majority of
the population became infected.
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In 2009, when the H5N1 avian flu pandemic started, Araz et al. studied the spread
of the pandemic throughout Arizona and studied the simulation of school closures
and how it affected the pandemic [4]. Authors used a compartmental model (SEIR)
and assumed only exposed individuals were travelling. The researchers looked at the
period that schools would be closed for and found that if only closed for 8 weeks (with
limitations for gatherings), the student infection rate due to a second wave would be
20.5% and the death rate 0.59%. On the other extreme, if the schools were closed for
9 months, the infection rate would be 3.35% and the death rate 0.1%. Furthermore,
they found that closing schools earlier would not affect the total rate of population
infection (within a span of 3 weeks) but would increase student deaths.
In 2014, Gemmetto, Barrat, and Cattuto published a paper focused on analyzing the
mitigation of infectious diseases at schools [22]. They modelled different mitigation
measures involving the closure of school classes, grades, or even the entire school.
The authors used a contact network based off of data collected from a primary school
in Lyon, France. The authors found that closing individual classes for 5 to 6 days
resulted in the same epidemic curve which indicated that classes should be closed for
about a school week for the maximum effect. On the other hand, closing a school
grade vs. closing the whole school results in the same amount of infections but a
slower reduction in infection rate for grade closures.
Granell and Mucha published a 2018 paper which presented a meta-population based
model to describe disease transmission where individuals’ mobility patterns were
clearly defined [23]. Meta-population models are temporal and spatial models that
study interactions amongst different populations of the same species. Different from
some other meta-population based models which assumed completely well mixed or
completely structured populations, the authors’ model presumed a recurrent mobility
pattern between an individual’s home and common destinations with mixing. They
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found that the spread of an epidemic was dependent on the mobility of individuals
and thus when mobility of infected individuals were gradually restricted, the epidemic
came closer to becoming extinct.
3.2 Covid-19 Studies
Due to the large impact that COVID-19 had on the world at large, there have been a
slew of papers focused on modelling COVID-19 and analyzing intervention methods.
3.2.1 Agent Based Models (ABM)
Kucharski et al. explored the effectiveness of isolation scenarios in terms of newly
infected and newly quarantined populations [32]. Using the BBC pandemic dataset
of around 40 thousand UK participants the researchers constructed a contact net-
work model. The BBC pandemic dataset was created by Klepac, et al for the BBC
documentary ”Contagion! The BBC Four Pandemic” [31]. The dataset focused on
self-reported social mixing contact data and allowed for fine-scale age-specific contact
matrices. Kucharski et al.’s modelling found that testing and contact tracing strate-
gies reduced reproduction more than mass testing or self isolation by themselves.
Furthermore, when looking at restrictions for the size of events, they found that the
event sizes had to be very small (less than 10-20) before a reduction in reproduction
would occur.
Rockett et al. used an agent-based model based off of the Australian population
census and simulated disease transmission in a multi-layered network [41]. The au-
thors simulated several mixing contexts such as households, neighborhoods (cluster of
four households), and local government areas. Furthermore, they specified a special
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case of wider community transmission where a household member infects a commu-
nity member who then infects another of the original household’s members thereby
throwing uncertainty in whether the disease was transmitted in the household or an
outside member. By continually testing new cases against cases that previously had
no known genomic link, the authors were able to newly identify clusters of infection.
3.2.2 Compartmental Models
Arenas et al. used a Microscopic Markov Chain Approach mobility model (MMCA)
to model the spread of COVID-19 and studied control measures and estimated the
peak incidence of COVID-19 in Spain [5]. MMCA is a set of discrete-time equations
for the probability of individual nodes in a network to be infected which allows the
construction of a phase diagram of the different infection models and their critical
properties. Their model takes into account asymptomatic individuals and ICU pa-
tients by creating a model with 7 compartments composing the meta-population along
with a split between the younger, middle-aged, and elderly sub-population. Besides
the common SEIR compartments, the authors added an Asymptomatic Infections,
ICU Hospitalized, and Dead compartment. The model also takes into account the
relatively more silent transmission among the younger population, the spatial dis-
semination by mobile adults, and severe symptoms caused in elderly that affect the
medical resources available to treat patients. The population is distributed into a
set of patches which as a baseline, allow inter-patch movement with no restrictions.
Using epidemiological parameters from the COVID-19 outbreak in Spain they found
that lower isolation rates led to the epidemic curve flattening which led to longer
epidemic periods with less impact on society. Larger isolation rates led to a reduced
epidemic size and a shorter epidemic wave duration.
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The practice of full population masking is widely adopted in Eastern countries; how-
ever, it is less common in their Western counterparts. Eikenberry et al. aimed to
model the effectiveness of masks (including homemade cloth masks) on a massive
scale during COVID-19 [18]. The authors used a Kermack-McKendrick-type com-
partmental mathematical model instead of an agent-based model. Using a previously
developed SEIR model for transmission dynamics, they developed a two-group model
which separated the population based on whether they used face masks. The au-
thors found that having more mask coverage along with effective masks is important
for protecting the population. Furthermore, they noted that delaying mask adoption
among the population could undermine the efficacy of mass mask usage. In their con-
clusion they urged that masks should be adopted early on regardless of transmission
intensities.
Chung and Chew used a SEIR model along with an additional multiplex and temporal
network to model the spread of COVID-19 in Singapore [13]. The multiplex network
is a network composed of multiple overlapping networks which each describe various
social connections. The aim of their multiplex network is to emulate real-world social
interactions and more effectively identify exit and prevention strategies for COVID-
19. Their multiplex network consisted of a household, dormitory, workplace, temporal
crowd, and temporal social gathering network. The household network is densely
connected and the population distribution is assumed to be a Poisson distribution.
The dormitory network in comparison with the household network is much more
connected and has a higher number of residents. The workplace network models
interactions within and between workplaces and the population is assumed to be
Gamma distributed. The school network is modeled similar to the workplace network.
Random groups of agents make up a ”social interaction” group and are used to fully
connect the temporal network. 45% of the household network are connected to the
workplace network (students are represented as ”working” at school) and 90% of
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dormitory workers are included in the workplace network. Using a branching process
estimator to evaluate the reproduction number (R0), they found that the gradual
lifting of social restrictions would flatten the epidemic curve while an immediate
return to social norm would lead to another huge wave.
Small and Cavanagh went an alternate route compared to many other COVID-19
compartmental modelling papers where instead of using precise knowledge of the epi-
demic’s transmission parameters, they demonstrated that a detailed enough contact
network is sufficient for capturing the spread of COVID-19 [46]. Similar to other com-
partmental models they use SEIR which stand for Susceptible, Exposed, Infected, and
Removed. The model proposed is a network switching model where the topology of
the network changes reflect different mitigation and control strategies. Instead of a
full-mixing approach the authors proposed an adjacency matrix of the contact net-
work where susceptible nodes can become exposed if there is an infected node nearby
and the exposed nodes would become infected with a certain probability. Similarly,
an infected node becomes removed at a certain probability. Then using their com-
partmental model they modeled four different kinds of control strategies:
1. No-control strategy: The network is modelled as a scale-free network. A scale-
free network is when the probability of nodes having a certain amount of con-
nections follows the power law. In this case this means that the majority of
individuals have a smaller number of connections but a small minority are able
to have an arbitrarily large number of contacts. This small minority allows for
any number of secondary transmissions and thus guarantees continued trans-
mission. This assumption of scale-free networks is acceptable since researchers
have found that the spread of Covid-19 follows the power law [48]
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2. Hard-isolation strategy: Using a two dimensional lattice, each node has four
adjacent neighbors. The nodes in this strategy do not move geographically and
can maybe correspond to familial units.
3. No mass gatherings strategy: Using a random graph with a degree of 4, nodes
make random connections that avoid multi-edges and self-loops. The graph is
binomial and thus there is a constant fixed probability that two random nodes
are linked which leads to an exponential spread but no super-spreader events
(where one individual infects a large amount).
4. Social distancing strategy: The authors used a small-world lattice where the
network is constructed as a regular lattice but each edge has a probability of
being disconnected and rewired to another random node. Small-world networks
are when most nodes in the network are not neighbors but are still reachable by
any other node via. a series of hops. As such, nodes in the small-world lattice
are geographically constrained but some fraction of the nodes have long range
connections.
The parameters of their model were as follows:
• Population Size
• Threshold infection load for first infection
• Probability of transferring from Susceptible to Exposed
• Probability of transferring from Exposed to Infected
• Probability of transferring from Infected to Removed
Testing their model on Perth, Western Australia with a population of approximately










(different probabilities are for
pre-peak and post-peak, respectively). The authors found that their model’s results




4.1 Cambria Case Study Description
As one of the methods to test our model, we decided to start with the small local com-
munity, Cambria village in San Luis Obispo County, California, United States. Using
the US Census Bureau data for July 1, 2019, Cambria’s population is 5,647 [7]. The
model for this Case Study will be a simple SIR model where Susceptible individuals
can become infected upon contact with Infected individuals. After approximately 14
days, an individual is assumed to be Recovered.
4.1.1 Case Study Assumptions
As part of the assumptions for Cambria, the first is that a majority of the population
are elderly as the US Census reveals that 41% of the population is 65 years old
and over. As part of this population assumption, the distribution of household sizes
no longer follows the Poisson Distribution mentioned in Section 4.2.5 but is instead
a custom distribution of 20% 1-person, 50% 2-person, and 30% 3-person homes to
account for more elderly individuals living with caretakers or other adults.
The second assumptions is about the travelling patterns of individuals in this com-
munity. In order to simplify assumptions, one individual from each household is
assumed to be the individual traveling to community centers and only that individ-
ual will travel. All other individuals are assumed to be stuck in the household unable
to travel. Understandably this does add an additional layer of inaccuracy to our
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ABM as in real life, all adult individuals can travel to community centers. We believe
this realistically approximates the behavior of the community during lockdown. We
imagine that the community centers in Cambria are grocery stores since there are
only two major ones.
The third assumption is that infected individuals will become recovered after 13-
15 days, which does not take into account deaths, hospitalizations, and longer tail
infection periods.
The fourth assumption is that there are no external contacts from outside of Cambria’s
community thus all infections come from inside the community including the initial
infection.
4.2 Model Design
In designing the model to simulate COVID-19’s spread we decided to use the Agent-
Based Model (ABM) approach in part due to the effectiveness of ABMs in modelling
individual interactions and simulating population dynamics.
4.2.1 Agent Design
Each of the agents in our model represent an individual inside of a community’s
population. All agents belong to a household which may have 0-3 other individuals
also belonging to that household. An agent will always belong to the same household.
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4.2.2 Environment Design
The model’s environment is divided into discrete time-steps to provide a frame of
reference for the epidemic spread and results. In order to better simulate a real
day’s 24 hour period, the model delineates four discrete time-steps to make up one
day. The time-steps that make up a day are Morning, Afternoon, Evening, and
Late Evening. During the Morning, Afternoon, and Evening time-steps, agents are
allowed to ”travel” to a community center as long as their travel is consistent with
the experiment’s parameters. At the Late Evening time-step, all agents are to return
home no matter their location. A community center is chosen to simulate essential
areas that individuals have to travel to, such as grocery stores and workplaces. The
idea of a community center as a focal point for individual travel is similar to related
papers that used them to better model individual mobility [23] [13].
As part of the environment design and experimental parameters, individuals may
travel to a community center at certain days of a week or households determine a
single individual that can travel while the other individuals in the household stay at
home. This seems to be a reasonable assumption for an aged population’s mobility
in a lockdown scenario.
4.2.3 Network Design
Our model is a directed graph G = (V,E) where each node v ∈ V represents an
individual agent and each edge e ∈ E denotes nodes that are in extensive contact.
Extensive contact is defined as enough contact that the transmission of disease is
possible. Each node v belongs to a clique C that represents the individual’s household.
A clique is defined as a graph where each node is connected with every other node.
As befitting a clique, each individual in a household has directed edges to and from
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every other individual in the household. When a node ”travels”, all edges they are
currently connected to are cut and the node forms new edges to other nodes at their
destination. The number of edges formed is dependent on the destination. This
process is the same whether nodes are traveling to a community center or back to
their household. Although later on the direction of the edges in the graph were not
ultimately expanded upon and can be treated as bidirectional edges, the directed
edges were kept for future flexibility.
An example of node movement over 4 timesteps is in Figure 4.1. There you can see
that at timestep 1, all the nodes are in their own household. At timestep 2, nodes
1, 5, 8, and 14 move from their respective household to a community center which
is shown by edges connecting the nodes together. At timestep 3 the previous nodes
return back to their own household and we can see that nodes 0 and 10 also connect
together by meeting at a community center. At timestep 4, all the nodes return back
to their own household since this is our ”Late Evening” timestep.
4.2.4 Implementation
Our ABM is built from the Python language using libraries such as numpy and
networkx to handle the network implementation and mathematical computing. The
rest of the ABM is built from scratch and uses a state-based design pattern to handle
a majority of the logic for travelling agents and agent information upkeep. On average
for a population of 5.6k, the program takes 0.1-0.2 seconds to run a single timestep.
This translates to 0.4-0.8 seconds for a single day. The program can be run by using
flags to enter parameters such as length of the experiment, infectious rate, exit factors,
and others.
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(a) Timestep 1 (b) Timestep 2
(c) Timestep 3 (d) Timestep 4
Figure 4.1: Sample of node movement in graph over 4 timesteps
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In order to run the experiments, we created a bash script that would run the program
on a variable amount of cores as a method of simulating parallel computing for our
program. Upon running our experiments and outputting the data to a text file, we
used python scripts to either read the data and produce data reports or produce
graphs used in this thesis.
4.2.5 Epidemic Model Assumptions
There are several assumptions that we are making for the epidemic’s parameters and
design. The first is that the infection probability upon contact between an infected
individual and an exposed individual is approximately 16%. This percentage was cho-
sen by rounding the overall household secondary attack rate found by a meta-analysis
of 54 studies [35]. Although the percentage provided by the paper is specifically for
household secondary attack rates which has more extended contact between individu-
als when compared to community centers like grocery stores, we will assume the worst
case in terms of contact and use this infection probability for community centers also.
A paper by Cevik and Marcus et al. using data from Cevik and Tate et al. found that
the viral load for Covid-19 had an incubation period of approximately 6 days and that
the infectious period starts 2 days before symptom onset and approximately 10 days
after symptom onset [10] [11]. An analysis of the viral load showed the following:
• 2 days before symptom onset to the day of symptom onset: A rise from minimal
zero load to peak viral load
• The day of symptom onset to 5 days after: Stable and consistent peak viral
load levels
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• 5 days after symptom onset to 10 days after: Decreasing viral load to minimal
levels.
This is visualized in the Cevik and Marcus et al. paper and is seen in Figure 4.2 [10]
Figure 4.2: Visualization of viral load of Covid-19 over time and in relation
to symptom onset [10]
Using this analysis on viral load, we alter the infection probability based on three
different periods, 2 days before symptom onset to the day of symptom onset, the day
of symptom onset to 5 days afterwards, and 5 days afterwards to 10 days afterwards.
This can be seen in Table 4.1. To account for varying periods of incubation and
infection period as not all infected individuals are the same, they are allowed to
randomly vary their incubation and recovery period by ±1.
Table 4.1: Time periods in relation to weighted infection probability
Days Infection Ratio
-2 to 0 0.75
0 to 5 1.0
5 to 10 0.5
Another assumption is the contact rate for individuals in a household and in com-
munity centers. It is assumed that the individuals in a household are fully connected
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and have equal chances of infection for each other individual. Household sizes are
assumed to be distributed according to a Poisson distribution with modifications for
specific cases [27]. Specific cases can include a larger emphasis on 2-3 family homes
for a community with a mostly older population as most elderly typically live with a
caretaker or family.
Figure 4.3: Sample distribution for a Community Center of size 30
As community centers are not typically fully connected, we assumed that individuals
will be interacting with a small subgroup in the community center. We chose a
gamma distribution with custom parameters to ensure that an individual mostly
comes into contact with a small amount of individuals such that the average contact
rate for infected to susceptible populations is relatively low. The max range of the
distribution is a third of the community center’s population while the minimum is
one contact. The max range is set arbitrarily and can be changed to fit different
scenarios. This gamma distribution is skewed right and an example can be seen in
Figure 4.3 for a community center of size 30.
In the example, there is a 50% chance of zero contacts (which is rounded to one since




5.1 Experiment Result Metrics
For analyzing the results of our experiments, we will mainly look at the infected pop-
ulation and metrics surrounding them. Two main metrics for an infectious population
are the total number of individuals infected over the course of the experiment and the
amount of individuals infected during the peak of the epidemic. The first metric is
used to identify the total spread of the disease and the second metric can be used to
visualize the severity of the disease during its peak which is important for modelling
the load of ICUs. Having a large infectious peak does not necessarily denote that
the disease is the most infectious but it does raise some flags and promotes a deeper
study of the experiment.
The third metric that we use is the R0 of the disease. As defined in Section 2.5.1, the
R0 is commonly used to measure the average amount of infections that an infected
individual will cause. This helps us identify how contagious an infectious disease is.
We will use the same calculation from our definition where given τ is the probability
of infection, c̄ the average contact rate for infected individuals, and d is the diseases’
infectious period, R0 = τ ∗ c̄ ∗ d.
Using these 3 main metrics we hope to understand the general progression of the
disease in each experiment and when needed, to dive deeper into the intricacies of
the experiment’s events.
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5.2 Cambria Case Study Experiments and Results
The experiments we will run for the Cambria case study will include the following:
1. Covid-19 spread without any interventions
2. Covid-19 spread with Mobility Restrictions (for all individuals)
3. Covid-19 spread with Mobility Restrictions and Mask Usage
4. Covid-19 spread with Quarantining
5.2.1 No Interventions
In order to simulate the ”no intervention” scenario, individuals will exit freely between
5 to 7 times a week and upon symptoms appearing will still travel around with
no interventions by individual or isolation strategies. Each of the no intervention
scenarios allows for a variable infection probability. This is because the infection
probability we are using may have a bias based on the location and different behaviors
during data collection. Thus by simulating different infection probabilities we can
achieve a deeper understanding of interventions’ affects on people. In order to simulate
the freely exiting factor of individuals, we use an Exit Factor which tries to evenly
space out the days an individual leaves. For example, given an Exit Factor of 3, an
individual’s first departing day is chosen randomly but the next day is 2 days away
and the following day is also 2 days away. So for a randomly chosen day of Monday,
the next exiting day is Wednesday, and the following is Friday.
Each simulation was run for 100 days and 10 times each to ensure consistency. One
of the first data points we are interested in is the amount of infected individuals
during the peak of Covid-19’s spread as an indication of how far the disease was able
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to spread. This can be seen in Table 5.1 where for each Exit Factor and different
Infectious Probabilities, the average percentage of infected individuals across 10 runs
is listed. That is to say a simulation where individuals travel 5 times a week and where
the disease has a 16% chance of infecting individuals during contact was able to infect
91.9% of the population during its peak. We believe this to be an underestimate as
people do not generally travel so regularly.
Table 5.1: Average Peak Infected Population for given Exit Factor and
Infection Probability
Infection Probability
0.16 .2 .3 .4 .5
Exit Factor
5 0.918 0.942 0.970 0.983 0.989
6 0.942 0.961 0.985 0.992 0.996
7 0.955 0.973 0.990 0.996 0.998
When plotting the results of the ten simulations, we find that the results match
in terms of general trend for infected populations while differing only in when the
infectious spike occurs. The changes in Infectious Probability are straightforward in
increasing the size of the infected population as seen in Table 5.1. As for the SIR
dynamics over the course of this experiment, an example of this can be found in
Figure 5.2. The figure depicts the SIR dynamics for an Exit Factor of 5 (exiting 5
times a week) and an Infectious Probability of 0.2 (20%). The x axis consists of the
experiment’s 100 day time while the y axis is the population percentage. Each of the
10 runs for a given Exit Factor and Infectious Probability are shown in the figure to
demonstrate the experiment’s consistency.
To visualize the average runs for two realistic Infectious Probabilities (16% and 30%)
we plotted the average infectious population for each Exit Factor in Figure 5.1. There
we can see that as expected, the population with an Exit Factor of 7 and Infectious
Probability of 30% had the largest spike on average. Furthermore we can also see that
the experiments with an Infectious Probability of 16% have an infection spike later
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than the corresponding experiments with an Infectious Probability of 30%. Another
result that follows from expectations is that the lower Infectious Probabilities resulted
in lower infection spikes.
Figure 5.1: Infectious Dynamics of Exit Factor 5-7 and Infectious Proba-
bility 0.16 and 0.3
As for the results of the Exit Factor, we can see that higher Exit Factors result
in a higher proportion of the population infected. Looking at the SIR dynamics
over the 100 day period we find that the infected population achieves a steep spike
in infections within 40 days of the introduction of an infected individual into the
community. Immediately before and after the infected population spike, we can see a
steep decrease in the susceptible population as individuals are rapidly infected. When
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compared with a simulation with an Exit Factor of 6 and the same infectious period
(Appendix A.1) we can find that the infection spike is slightly higher, the infection
spike occurs earlier but otherwise it results in a similar behavior. The infection lasts
approximately 40-60 days even for the experiment with the lowest infection chance
(Exit factor of 5 and Infectious Probability of 0.16). By the end of the infection,
the virus dies out since there are no more readily available Susceptible individuals to
continue the virus’ spread.
As seen in the Figure 5.2, the infected population is roughly 99-100% of the entire
population thus completely infecting the community.
Figure 5.2: SIR Dynamics of Exit Factor 5 and Infectious Probability 0.2
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As a base case for modelling the spread of Covid-19, these results serve as an inspec-
tion of how the model occurs given zero interventions and encouraging the spread of
the disease. As evidenced by the exponential growth of the infectious population, the
disease performs as expected.
5.2.2 Mobility Restrictions for all individuals
Mobility restrictions for all individuals is characterized by limiting how often an indi-
vidual exits during a week. As the no restriction experiment consisted of individuals
leaving 5 to 7 days a week, this experiment consists of individuals leaving 1 to 4 days
a week. Similar to the prior experiment, each respective Exit Factor and Infectious
Probability were ran for 100 days and 10 times each.
5.2.2.1 Comparison with No Intervention case
Table 5.2: Average Peak Infected Population for a Mobility Restricted
community
Infection Probability
0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Exit Factor
1 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.014 0.016
2 0.148 0.166 0.174 0.233 0.241
3 0.436 0.458 0.476 0.494 0.515
4 0.492 0.462 0.481 0.456 0.522
5 0.918 0.942 0.970 0.983 0.989
The results for the infected population’s peak can be seen in Table 5.2. The table
also includes the Exit Factor of 5 as a benchmark from the no intervention case. In
comparison to the benchmark we can see that average peak infected population for
each given Exit Factor and each Infectious Probability is relatively low. Furthermore
we can see that there is a tipping point between an Exit Factor of 4 or 5 no matter
the Infectious Probability as the Infectious Probability jumps a significant amount.
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For instance, at an Exit Factor of 4 and Infectious Probability of 0.5, we can see that
the highest percentage of population that was infected at one time was 54.7% while
in comparison to an Exit Factor of 5 and the same Infectious Probability (0.5) we see
that the highest percentage infected was 98.9%.
5.2.2.2 Decrease in peak even with increased Infectivity
We can see an observed decrease of peak infected individuals even though the In-
fectious Probability is increasing. For an Exit Factor of 1, the peak decreases from
Infectious Probability of 0.2 to 0.3. For an Exit Factor of 4, the peak decreases from
infection probability 0.16 to 0.2 and 0.3 to 0.4. A concise summary of these decreases
is in Table 5.3. Exit factors 2 and 3 are not in the table because their peaks were
monotonically increasing and dashes are to signify that the value was lower than the
next peak.
Table 5.3: Observed decrease in peak of infected individuals
Infection Probability
Exit Factor
0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4
1 - 0.004 0.003 -
4 0.492 0.462 0.481 0.456
Looking at the raw data for each simulation we found that these could be explained
by an inopportune placement of the initial infected individual. Given a low Exit
Factor and low Infectious Probability and the assumption that individuals’ infectious
periods are approximately a 12 day period (from Section 4.2.5), an individual may
only exit once or twice during this entire 12 day period and if they exit while their
viral load is relatively low they may not be able to infect as many individuals as they
should.
However this may not be as feasible of an explanation for the case of Exit Factor 4.
Individuals can exit about 3 times during the infectious period.
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Figure 5.3: IR Dynamics for an Exit Factor of 4
Looking through the logs we can find that in part due to the higher Infectivity rate
of the disease, there was a relatively earlier spike in infections which led to an earlier
recovery rate of individuals. The earlier spike of recovered individuals decelerates the
spread of infected individuals, as the infection is unable to find enough susceptible
individuals to continue increasing exponentially.
This can be seen in Figure 5.3 which graphs the infectious and recovered population
for Exit Factor 4 and Infectious Probabilities 16%, 20%, 30%, and 40%. In the figure
we see that for each increase in Infectious Probability, the infected peak is earlier. For
instance for 40%, the peak is around day 20 but is around day 30 for 16%. Similarly,
the recovery curve starts increasing earlier for higher infectious rates.
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Table 5.4: Total average infected population percentage
Infection Probability
0.16 .2 .3 .4 .5
Exit Factor 1 .002 0.008 0.009 0.03 0.031
2 0.228 0.228 0.205 0.256 0.259
3 0.531 0.526 0.513 0.518 0.531
4 0.54 0.499 0.500 0.467 0.527
5.2.2.3 Total percentage of population infected
The total infected population after 100 days averaged over 10 runs can be seen in
Table 5.4. We can see a marked increase from an Exit Factor of 2 to an Exit Factor of
3. For an Exit Factor of 2 the total infected population averages between 20% to 26%
depending on the infection probability while for an Exit Factor of 3 the total infected
population averages between 51% to 53% depending on the infection probability.
An interesting trend is that the total average infected population for an Infectious
Probability of 16% vs 20-30% is actually higher in some cases. Looking at the SIR
dynamics over time in Figure 5.4, we find that with each increase in Infectious Prob-
ability, the spikes in infections happens earlier and earlier.
For instance, for an Exit Factor of 2 and Infectious Probability 16%, the average peak
for infections happens around day 42. For an Exit Factor of 2 and Infectious Prob-
ability 50%, the average peak for infections happens around day 30. Furthermore,
the spikes in infections happens at a greater rate too. Given an Exit Factor of 2,
the largest spike in infections is 2.2% of the population when the Infectious Prob-
ability is 16%. When the Infectious Probability is 50%, the greatest spike is 4.1%.
This is equivalent to a difference in approximately 130 people infected. Thus we can
hypothesize that because of the faster spike in infections and mobility restrictions,
the infected population recovers at a much faster rate than they can infect other
individuals. Although there is an increase in Infectious Probability, the infectious
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Figure 5.4: SIR Dynamics of Exit Factor 4 and Infectious Probability 0.3
period combined with a reduced number of susceptible individuals results in reduced
infections. Thus lower Infectious Probabilities do not necessarily correspond with a
lower amount of infected individuals.
5.2.2.4 Measuring R0
The R0 for this experiment can be seen in Table ??. The R0 follows as expected
where lower Exit Factors and lower Infectious Probabilities correlate with a lower
R0 while the opposite also holds true. In comparison to empirically observed R0s for
COVID-19, we find that our R0 values are much lower. A cohort study of transmission
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dynamics in California and Washington revealed that the R0 in Northern California
was estimated to be between 1.39 and 1.54 while it was between 2.06 and 2.49 in
Southern California [34]. Possible reasons why our R0 is lower than real-world values
is in the model assumptions that we make. One of the bigger assumptions includes
Table 5.5: Average calculated R0 for a mobility restricted community
Infection Probability
0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Exit Factor
1 0.311 1.037 1.337 2.606 3.564
2 3.055 3.331 3.169 4.612 5.957
3 4.571 5.766 5.592 6.860 9.280
4 5.319 5.125 6.054 7.578 10.589
From the results of this experiment, it shows that mobility restriction may be a
promising method of intervention in reducing the amount of infected individuals.
Furthermore, this experiment is under the assumption that symptomatic individuals
do not change any of their behavior, which is atypical for sick individuals. Even in
this worst case, where symptomatic individuals are allowed to travel freely and spread
the illness and with a worst case infection probability of 0.5, mobility restrictions are
still able to reduce the peak infected population greatly in comparison to Section
5.2.1 where all of the infected populations were 90% and above.
5.2.3 Mobility Restrictions and 100% Mask Usage
This experiment uses the mobility restrictions from Section 5.2.2 in conjunction with
simulating mask usage. Mask usage is dictated by a percentage reduction in disease
transmission. As part of this experiment, we hope to answer the question of whether
mask wearing combined with mobility restrictions are useful in reducing infection
rates. As seen in Section 5.2.1, an Exit Factor of 5 is almost similar to Exit Factors
of 6 and 7 in terms of the number of infected individuals. Thus, when experimenting
with mobility restrictions for this experiment (Exit Factors of 1 to 4) we also included
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an Exit Factor of 5 in order to see the results of mask usage on both a non-intervention
base case and a mobility restriction case.
5.2.3.1 Assumptions for Mask Wearing
A case-control study of person protective measures (PPE) for Covid-19 in Thailand
was published by Doung-ngern et al [17]. In the study, the authors analyzed 839 close
contacts of 211 initial infected individuals. The authors found that the adjusted odds
ratio for risk of Covid-19 infection and wearing a mask at all times during contact
with a Covid-19 patient was 0.23. As such to simulate the usage of masks, we reduced
the probability of transmission by a factor of 0.23 when an infected individual wearing
a mask is in contact with susceptible individuals. A literature review of studies of
the effect of mask wearing on Covid-19 found a similar infection reduction of around
0.7 to 0.79 [6].
As part of the first run for this experiment, it is assumed that everyone is wearing
masks although this is not completely accurate when looking at the trends of mask
wearing during the Covid-19 pandemic. A paper by Haischer et al. studied the per-
centage of mask wearers entering retail stores between June and August of 2020. They
found that before any store mandates, 80% of individuals were wearing masks and
even with state mandates 96% of individuals wore masks [24]. The lowest percentage




After restricting mobility such that individuals only leave their households a certain
amount of times a week and having everyone use masks, the average peak infected
population has a small decrease in comparison with just using mobility restrictions.
Table 5.6: Average Peak Infected Population for a mobility restricted and
mask wearing community
Infection Probability
0.16 .2 .3 .4 .5
Exit Factor
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.001
2 0.003 0.002 0.036 0.088 0.087
3 0.039 0.133 0.302 0.353 0.419
4 0.239 0.263 0.361 0.39 0.498
5 0.619 0.806 0.863 0.909 0.934
For instance, for an Exit Factor of 4 and an infection probability of 50%, which should
lead to the most amount of individuals infected, the average peak was 49.8% of the
population while with only mobility restrictions it was 51.5%. While this difference is
not the largest, other drops in peak infected individuals are noticeable such as for an
Exit Factor of 2 and infection probability of 16% which dropped 14.5% from 14.8% to
0.3%. Furthermore, looking at our ”no restriction” case, where individuals can leave
up to 5 times a week, we found that there is a great decrease for the lower infection
probabilities, especially for an infection probability of 16%. Table 5.1 shows that
the average peak for a ”no intervention” scenario is 91.8% whereas in this case it is
61.9%. This confirms that if 100% of the population wore masks and had mobility
restrictions for how often they left, there would be a decrease in infections.
As seen in Section 5.2.2, a lower Infectious Probability does not necessarily correlate
with a lower total infected population. This can once again be seen in Table 5.7 where
there are several drops in total infected population even with an increase in Infectivity.
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Table 5.7: Average Total Infected Population for a mobility restricted and
mask wearing community
Infection Probability
0.16 .2 .3 .4 .5
Exit Factor
1 0.001 0.0 0.001 0.001 0.001
2 0.008 0.005 0.1 0.198 0.158
3 0.099 0.284 0.472 0.502 0.526
4 0.406 0.416 0.478 0.458 0.544
5 0.89 0.998 1.0 1.0 1.0
For instance, the case when the Exit Factor is 2 and the Infectious Probability is 40%
vs. 50%.
Visualizing the infectious population for relatively reasonable Infectious Probability
assumptions in Figure 5.5, we can see a remarkable decrease in the peak of infected
individuals. In comparison to Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.3 we can see that the infectious
curves are flattening out. Following on from the previous analysis of the peak infected
population, we can see that the average total infected population is smaller than when
there are only mobility restrictions once again verifying that masks result in a lower
rate of infections.
Interestingly we can see that two of the curves are slightly flattening out but also
extending past day 100. This is in sharp contrast with previous experiments which
usually ended before day 100 either due to a completely infected population or due
to a completely non-infected population.
5.2.4 Mobility Restrictions and Variable Mask Usage (90% and 80%)
For these experiments, we will vary the percentage of mask wearers along with the
mobility restrictions and Infectious Probabilities.
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Figure 5.5: Infected population for Infectious Probability 16% and 30%
5.2.4.1 Results
The average total infected population for the 90% and 80% mask usage can be seen
in Table 5.8. From there we can see that as expected, there is a higher percentage of
the population that gets infected as the percentage of mask wearers decreases. For
instance for an Exit Factor of 4 and 20% Infectious Probability, 100% mask usage
has 41.6% of the population infected, 90% mask usage has 42.1% of the population
infected, and 80% mask usage has 51.1% of the population infected.
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Table 5.8: Average total infected population for mobility restrictions com-
bined with 90% and 80% mask usage
Infection Probability
90% Mask Usage 80% Mask Usage
.16 .2 .3 .4 .5 .16 .2 .3 .4 .5
Exits
1 0.001 0.0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0 0.001 0.0 0.0
2 0.028 0.034 0.113 0.246 0.255 0.041 0.114 0.096 0.253 0.25
3 0.358 0.310 0.464 0.512 0.442 0.402 0.289 0.492 0.411 0.503
4 0.442 0.421 0.471 0.511 0.545 0.423 0.511 0.499 0.545 0.542
5 0.997 0.999 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.998 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Furthermore, when looking at results from an Infectious probability of 16%, we find
that 80% Mask Usage and varying between Exit Factors 3 and 4 results in almost
the same infected population. In comparison with just using mobility restrictions,
we find that the total infected population decreases for lower Infectious Probabilities
(16% to 30%) while remains the same for higher Infectious Probabilities (40 - 50%).
In particular, the average range of infected individuals with only mobility restrictions
is approximately 50% for Exit Factors 3 & 4. While with 90% Mask Usage, it ranges
from 31% to 47% and 29-50% for 80% Mask Usage.
5.2.4.2 Clustered Experiment Results
The increase in infected individuals is not uniform, for instance comparing the total
infected for an Exit Factor of 4 and 16% Infectious Probability, we can see that 44.2%
of the population is infected with 90% mask usage but only 42.3% of the population
is infected with 80% mask usage. Diving deeper into the logs, we can see that for
80% mask usage, each run can be split into 3 different clusters. The first is a total
infection of almost 0% (0.0885%), the second is a total infection of about 40-42%, and
the third is a total infection of 57-59%. The first cluster is a clear outlier and due to
unlucky placement of the initial infection and consists only of 1 out of the 10 runs.
The second and third cluster consist of 6 and 3 runs, respectively. 90% mask usage
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also falls into similar clusters with the first being roughly 0.0177%, the second being
39%, and the third being 55-57%. The second and third clusters make up 4 and 5
runs respectively. This data can be seen in Table 5.9. After removing the outliers,
the average for 90% mask usage is 49.07% and 80% is 47.01%.
Table 5.9: Cluster Analysis of Exit Factor 4
90% Mask Usage 80% Mask Usage
Cluster Number of Runs Cluster Number of Runs
∼0% 1 ∼0% 1
∼39% 4 ∼40-42% 6
∼55-57% 5 ∼57-59% 3
From this we can see that there is a higher occurrence of lower cases in 80% Mask
Usage vs 90% Mask Usage. Thus, when calculating the average, we find that the 80%
Mask Usage has a lower average total infected population while 90% Mask Usage is
higher. However, looking at the clusters we can see that the clusters are higher for
80% Mask Usage (40-42% vs. 39%) and (57-59% vs. 55-57%) which means that with
lower mask usage, the population of infected is still higher despite what the average
value looks like.
Overall, we still see a decrease in the total infected population when using masks
however between 90-80% Mask Usage requires more study on the varying clusters
and any additional issues.
5.2.5 100% Quarantine Compliance Strategy
As mentioned in previous experiments, much of our results can be viewed as worst-
case scenarios as individuals who are symptomatic do not take steps to prevent further
spread of the virus. However, as evidenced by the Covid-19 pandemic, not all indi-
viduals can or will stay home if they are symptomatic due to life circumstances or
beliefs. Thus, for this section we will explore the impacts of individuals that quar-
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antine themselves once symptoms start and the impact of varying the percentage of
individuals who will quarantine. Furthermore, we will explore combining this quar-
antining strategy with prior strategies such as mobility restrictions and mask usage.
To start off, we will assume that 100% individuals will quarantine themselves upon
symptoms of Covid-19 showing up. Quarantine consists of individuals staying home
and not travelling. Furthermore, we assume that individuals quarantine indepen-
dently. That is to say a household may have individuals who will or will not quaran-
tine.
Future sections will consist of varying the percentage of the population who will
quarantine and making quarantines apply for households even if individuals are not
infected.
5.2.5.1 Results




0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1 0.001 0.0 0.001 0.0 0.0
2 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.046 0.076
3 0.001 0.121 0.238 0.318 0.249
4 0.13 0.312 0.368 0.31 0.466
5 0.525 0.749 0.79 0.698 0.5
The first takeaway from our results in Table 5.10 is that 100% Quarantine compliance
is effective in reducing the total infected population across the board no matter the
Exit Factor and Infectious Probability.
Looking at the results in Table 5.10 we find that almost all of the results are not
monotonically increasing as was common in previous sections. In some cases the
decrease is not significant, such as Exit Factor 2 and going from 20% to 30% Infec-
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tivity which saw a drop of 0.8% being infected. However, other decreases are much
more noticeable. For instance, Exit factor of 5 jumped from an average 79% of the
total population being infected at a 30% infection chance to an average 50% of the
population being infected at 50% infection chance. We have aggregated the drops in
infection into Table 5.11. Similar to Table 5.3, the dashes signify that the values are
monotonically increasing in order to better visualize the drops. Infectious probability
16% was removed because all the peaks were less than those of Infectious probability
20%. For instance for Exit Factor 2, the dashes for 40% and 50% Infectiousness are
0.046 and 0.076, both of which increase monotonically from 0.001.




0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2 0.009 0.001 - -
3 - - 0.318 0.249
4 - 0.368 0.31 -
5 - 0.79 0.698 0.5
5.2.5.2 Clustered Runs
The most concerning result we find is the drop recorded in Exit Factor 5 with a 29%
drop in total infected population. Similar to Section 5.2.4 we find that there are very
different clusters of results. For instance for an Exit Factor of 5 and Infectivity of 50%,
we find that 4
10
runs resulted in slightly above 0% of the population being infected.
On the other hand 6
10
runs resulted in 99-100% of the population being infected. A
hypothesis that can be gleaned from this data is that quarantining allows for more
chances to stop the disease before it starts to spread exponentially. Because of the
two different extremes, the average total infected population averages out to such a
low total infected population. This applies to all of the other notable decreases except
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there are 3 clusters in other cases. For instance given an Exit Factor of 3, there are
3 clusters of average infected population, 0-20%, 33-40%, and 53-59%.
In order to better test this hypothesis and because the clustering is so evident, we
decided to walk through the experiments step by step.
For the almost 0% infection clusters, we can see that the first infected individual
becomes symptomatic just as they planned on travelling to a community center.
Due to the 100% quarantine compliance, the infected individual stayed home until
they recovered from their illness.1 For the almost 100% infection clusters, we can
see that the infected individual went to a community center the morning of Day
5 (1 day before symptom onset) and infected 2 other individuals. Because of this
pre-symptomatic infection, the 2 other infected individuals manage to visit another
community center before their symptom onset and thereby manage to start spreading
the disease exponentially.
From this we can confirm that the 100% Quarantine compliance works as expected
and quarantining individuals leads to more chances for the disease to stop spreading
entirely.
5.2.5.3 Clustered Runs in relation to Infectivity
Looking at the experiments with an Exit Factor of 3 and 4 there are three clusters
instead of the two clusters seen when given an Exit Factor of 5. In particular, the
three clusters are approximately 0-20%, 33-40%, and 53-59%. The clusters were
found by identifying sequences of runs more than 10% apart. Because of the larger
drop for an Exit Factor of 3, we will focus on its clusters. In order to ensure statistical
consistency, we ran these experiments an additional 40 times for a total of 50 times.
1For verification purposes, an example seed for this run is 8970356428476678143
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Table 5.12: Clustered Runs given an Exit Factor of 3
40% Infectiousness 50% Infectiousness
Cluster Number of Runs Cluster Number of Runs
∼0-12% 19 ∼0-18% 25
∼33-39% 10 ∼37-43% 12
∼53-57% 21 ∼54-59% 13
Each cluster and the number of runs associated with the clusters can be seen in Table
5.12, where there is a noticeable difference in clustering depending on the Infectious
Probability. In particular, for 40% infectiousness, we can see that 21
50
runs infected
53-57% of the population while for 50% infectiousness, 25
50
runs infected 0-18% of
the population. Therefore, we now know why the average total infected population
dropped even though the infectiousness of the disease increased. Furthermore, the
cluster ranges are higher for higher infectiousness which falls in line with how a disease
with a higher infection rate should behave.
Looking through a run which ends pre-maturely (37-43%) we find that in the be-
ginning the infected population increases exponentially as infected individuals get
lucky and spread the disease before quarantining measures take place. This can be
seen in Figure 5.6 as both averages spike between Day 20 and Day 40. We note
that even with a higher infectious rate, an Infectious Probability of 50% results in
a lower and earlier spike in infections. This is a result of the higher infectious rate,
which allows for lucky infected individuals to spread the disease more easily dur-
ing pre-symptomatic infections. As a result of the quarantine strategy, we find that
any increases in infected population depend heavily on pre-symptomatic individuals.
However, as the infected population grows larger and the pool of susceptible individ-
uals decreases, pre-symptomatic individuals come into less contact with individuals
and are not able to infect as many new individuals. With a lack of new individuals
to drive the pre-symptomatic infections, the infected population eventually dies out.
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Figure 5.6: Average infected population for Exit 3 and Infectiousness 16%
and 30%
We hypothesize that given a high enough infectious rate and 100% quarantine com-
pliance, the disease may burn itself out by infecting too many individuals in the
beginning of its spread which starves any future susceptible populations. This leads
to a negative feedback loop that eventually wipes out the disease by itself.
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Table 5.13: 90% and 80% Quarantine Compliance Average total infected
population
Infection Probability
90% Quarantine Compliance 80% Quarantine Compliance
Exits
0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1 0.001 0.0 0.001 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.001 0.0 0.001 0.001
2 0.005 0.019 0.067 0.13 0.08 2 0.047 0.026 0.026 0.14 0.114
3 0.247 0.166 0.243 0.294 0.466 3 0.167 0.187 0.425 0.356 0.341
4 0.391 0.325 0.447 0.518 0.5 4 0.378 0.415 0.534 0.502 0.429
5 0.49 0.597 0.5 0.9 0.7 5 0.597 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8
5.2.6 Variable Quarantine Strategies (90%, 80%)
Similar to Section 5.2.5, we find that at 40 and 50% Infectious probability, there is
a drop in the average infected population. This may be due to the possible burnout
hypothesized in Section 5.2.5.3.
To simplify comparisons, we approximated the range of infected populations across
all Infectious Probabilities and filled out Table 5.14





1 ∼0-0.001 ∼0-0.001 ∼0-0.001
2 ∼0.001-0.08 ∼0.005-0.13 ∼0.03-0.11
3 ∼0.001-0.249 ∼0.17-0.47 ∼0.17-0.43
4 ∼0.13-0.466 ∼0.33-0.52 ∼0.38-0.53
5 ∼0.5-0.8 ∼0.5-0.9 ∼0.6-0.9
We can see that there is a great difference between 100% Quarantine compliance and
90/80% Quarantine compliance. In comparison with 100% Quarantine Compliance we
find that the average infected population has increased as the quarantine compliance
rate decreases. Looking only at an Infectious Probability of 16% and more significant
infections, we find that even with an Exit Factor of 4, a 100% Quarantine compliance
can lead to 13% of the population being infected. Surprisingly we also see that for
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an Exit Factor of 3 but 80% Quarantine compliance, 17% of the population becomes
infected.
In comparison with just using masks, Quarantine compliance has a much lower total
infection rate. For these comparisons, we exclude Exit Factors 1 and 2 since all of the
results resolve to around 0%. When comparing 100% Mask Usage with 100% Quar-
antine compliance, we find that at 16% Infectious probability, Quarantine compliance
performs better with an almost 10% drop in infected individuals no matter the Exit
Factor. At 20 and 30% Infectious probability, the drop in infected individuals is not
as large but still significant.
5.2.7 Dependent Quarantine Strategies
One assumption we used for previous Quarantine strategies (Section 5.2.5) is that in-
dividuals quarantine independently of each other. We define dependent quarantining
as households quarantining as one. Previously, individuals quarantined by themselves
and it was possible for a household to have someone still traveling around but another
member in quarantine. To see if quarantining as a household or quarantining as an
individual has an effect on the infected population, we tested the same experiments
in terms of Exit Factors and Infectious Probability. One important note for our de-
pendent vs. independent strategy comparison is that because of our assumptions for
individual traveling behaviors, dependent quarantining is aimed towards preventing
the first infections in the pandemic. This is because of the assumption that only a
single individual leaves the household, thus independent vs. dependent really only
affects the first series of pre-symptomatic infections and thereby may not lead to large
changes that we can expect from dependent quarantining.
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5.2.7.1 100% Quarantine Compliance
Starting off with 100% Quarantine compliance, we can see the comparison in Table
5.15. The raw values for average total infected population can be seen in Table A.1
in the Appendix.




0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1 -0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.0
2 0 -0.008 0.034 0.043 0.074
3 0.054 -0.119 0.123 0.046 0.2
4 0.059 0.068 0.025 0.201 -0.095
5 0.08 0.003 -0.195 0.001 0.3
Overall for Exit Factors 1 and 2, there is almost 0 difference between independent
and dependent quarantining. For Exit Factors 3 we can see a slight increase for 16%
and 30% Infectiousness but a decrease for 20% Infectiousness. This means that when
households quarantine as one, there was an increase of 5.4% individuals infected given
an Infectious probability of 16%. Similarly there was a 11.9% decrease in infected
individuals when the Infectious Probability was 20% and the Exit Factor was 3.
Overall, for Exit Factors 4 and 5, the lower Infectious Probabilities (16% to 30%) are
relatively stable with changes as high as 8% and as low as -20%.
The two largest changes were a 20% and 30% increase in infected individuals given
large Infectious Probabilities (40-50%).
These results seem to indicate that overall for smaller Infectious Probabilities (16-
30%), dependent quarantining can result in lower infection rates.
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5.2.7.2 90% Quarantine Compliance
The raw results for the 90% Quarantine Compliance total infected population can be
viewed in Table A.2 in the Appendix.




0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1 -0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.0
2 -0.003 -0.007 0.006 0.027 0.003
3 0.054 -0.007 0.045 0.059 -0.126
4 -0.051 0.093 0.078 -0.132 -0.04
5 0.099 0 0.499 -0.4 0.2
Similar to the previous section (Section 5.2.7.1), we see that for Exit Factors 1 and
2, the changes are almost 0%. For Exit Factors 3-5 and lower infectious rates (16%
to 30%), almost every comparison has a low percentage change between -5% to 9.9%.
However, the most noticeable is the 49.9% increase in infected individuals from house-
hold dependent quarantining. The logs detail that out of 10 runs for Exit Factor 5
and Infectious Probability 30%, 10
10
runs infected 99-100% of the population. Simi-
larly for Infectious probability 50%, where a 20% increase in infected individuals was
noted. The logs recorded 9
10
runs infecting 100% of the population while one run only
infected 0.1%.
Besides the two outliers, most of the differences are in the realm of 10% or even lower,
which suggests a minimal difference in dependent quarantining for 90% Quarantine
compliance.
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5.2.7.3 80% Quarantine Compliance
Similar to previous sections, the raw results for total infected population is visible in
the Appendix at Table A.3




0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1 0.0 0 0.001 -0.001 0
2 -0.046 0.083 0.078 -0.03 -0.001
3 0.1 0.096 -.126 -0.069 0.018
4 0.016 -0.087 -0.217 -0.144 0.064
5 -0.099 -0.1 -0.3 0 0.1
The comparison between 80% Dependent Quarantine and Independent 80% Quar-
antine can be seen in Table 5.17 with a much different result compared to previous
comparisons. In this case almost all differences are less than 10% with many being
negative (which means that dependent quarantining resulted in less infected individ-
uals). In particular, we can see that for an Exit Factor of 4 and Infectious probability
of 30%, dependent quarantining results in 21.7% less infected individuals on average.
Overall, we can see that having households quarantine as one results in minuscule
effects to the infected population and even helps to reduce the number of infected in
several cases.
5.2.8 Reverse Engineering R0
To validate some of our results, we attempted to replicate current pandemic condi-
tions and reverse engineer the Infectious Probability to closely approximate real-world
R0 values observed in California. To replicate current pandemic conditions, we varied
quarantine compliance to 80% and mask usage to 80% and mainly focused on Infec-
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tious Probabilities 10%, 16%, and 20%. Similar to previous experiments, we attempt
both dependent and independent quarantining.
A quarantine compliance of 80% and mask usage of 80% was chosen to replicate
the non-uniform compliance with intervention methods, a reasonable assumption is
that if individuals will not comply with quarantine/mask interventions then they will
not comply with mask/quarantine interventions. The Infectious Probabilities were
limited to 10%, 16%, and 20% (with 10% being added specifically for this section)
to replicate a more reasonable infectiousness since it has already been stated for 16%
we assume close to worst case infectiousness [35].
5.2.8.1 Independent Quarantining





1 0.35 0.684 0.444
2 1.632 1.001 2.539
3 1.397 4.86 2.066
4 2.704 5.708 10.072
5 4.663 9.044 10.827
As stated in Section 5.2.2.4, a cohort study found that secondary infections were
estimated to be between 1.39 and 1.54 for Northern California and 2.06 to 2.49 for
Southern California. Taking the 95% confidence interval for the whole of California,
the range of secondary infections would then be from 1.14 to 3.33. Looking at our
results in Table 5.18, we can see that for an Infectious Probability of 10%, Exit Factors
2 to 4 fall in line with the R0 set by the cohort study. Other similar experiments
include Infectious Probability 20% for Exit Factor 2 and 3.
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5.2.8.2 Dependent Quarantining





1 0.434 0.556 0.926
2 0.821 1.691 2.977
3 0.991 4.051 3.734
4 3.796 7.523 8.447
5 2.857 7.352 13.07
The results that fall in the range of the cohort’s study include Exit 2 16% Infectious-
ness, Exit 2 20% Infectiousness, and Exit 3 20% Infectiousness. While some of the
other results do not fall into the 95% confidence interval listed by the cohort study,
their R0 values fall very close to the range. This includes results for all Exit Factors
& Infectiousness of 10% and Exit Factors 1-3 for Infectiousness of 16% and 20%.
5.2.8.3 Validity
Ultimately for both dependent and independent quarantining, we find that for a
reasonable infectious probability and intervention methods, we are able to replicate
the R0’s found in real-world studies of Covid-19 spread throughout California. It is to
be noted that R0 is a highly location dependent measure as different communities can
lead to unique interactions thereby affecting what the R0 is. Taking this into account,
this section is not a complete validation of our ABM’s accuracy for predicting real-
world epidemic dynamics in Cambria but does take a step towards it.
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Chapter 6
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
Over the course of this thesis, we have presented an Agent-Based Model (ABM) for
simulating Covid-19 and applied to to the local community, Cambria Village. We
simulated several scenarios:
1. Covid-19 spread without any interventions
2. Covid-19 spread with Mobility Restrictions
3. Covid-19 spread with Mobility Restrictions and variable Mask Usage
4. Covid-19 spread with Mobility Restrictions and variable Quarantine Compliance
6.1 Covid-19 spread without interventions
In this experiment, we mainly tested the capabilities of our ABM and to develop
a base case to compare other experiments with. As expected, the disease infected
approximately 100% of the population given no interventions and while varying the
infectious probability.
6.2 Covid-19 spread with Mobility Restrictions
This experiment focused on restricting individuals’ travel so that individuals could
only travel 1-4 times a week. We found that leaving 4 times a week would on average
infect 50-55% of the population. In comparison with our no intervention scenario of
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exiting 5-7 times a week, which infected 100% of the population, we found a turning
point between leaving 4 and 5 times a week that increased the infected population
by 50%. Furthermore, the infected population did not follow with higher infectious
rates, which led to a proposal that earlier spikes in infected populations could lead
to a faster recovery spike and less infected individuals overall.
6.3 Covid-19 spread with Mobility Restrictions and variable Mask Usage
Building on our previous section with mobility restrictions, this experiment tested
variable mask usage from 100-80% of the population wearing masks. At a 100%
Mask Usage, the infected population was reduced but also in some cases the duration
of the disease was extended past 100 days. We found that when the 80 to 90% of the
population used masks, we started finding 2-3 clusters in our data. In comparison
with our mobility restrictions results and no intervention results, mask usage was still
useful in reducing the infected population.
6.4 Covid-19 spread with Mobility Restrictions and variable Quarantine
Compliance
Our final experiment focused on implementing varying level of quarantine compli-
ance. In particular, 80-100% of the population would quarantine when they start
showing symptoms and we observed how that affected Covid-19 spread. One of the
first discoveries was that similar to our Mask Usage experiment, we were experiencing
clusters in our data. The clusters could be 2-3 clusters and we proposed a hypothesis
on why these clusters came to be. In addition, we compared quarantining as a house-
hold and quarantining as an individual and found that quarantining as a household
helped to reduce or cause no change in total infection levels for most lower infectious
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rate cases. Overall, we found that complying with quarantine restrictions helped to
reduce the spread of Covid-19 and would stop the virus within 100 days.
6.5 Future Work
As discussed in the previous sections, we have raised several interesting scenarios.
The first was that given a high enough infectious rate and isolation strategies such
as quarantine compliance or mask usage, a disease may burn itself out. This may
be due to a lack of potential susceptible individuals or another undiscovered reason.
Another scenario was in studying the turning point between leaving 4 and 5 times a
week and why this caused such a large increase in infected individuals.
In addition, there are multiple extensions to this thesis that can be done. In particular,
simulating contact tracing, age-based networks, and additional community centers
like workplaces and schools would be beneficial to better understanding the spread
of Covid-19.
Finally, our model can be better fine tuned for local communities. To better un-
derstand unique mobility restrictions we could survey the population of Cambria to
get a better understanding of the community’s mobility dynamics. In particular, we






Although agent-based models enable a more bottom-up approach in studying individ-
uals and populations during infectious diseases, there are certain limitations associ-
ated with agent-based models that apply to our implemented model. As a stochastic
model, ABMs have an innate uncertainty associated with it and adding different tun-
ing factors in the simulation can lead to increased uncertainty [19]. Our approach
for the ABM works backwards by defining relationships to create the model instead
of using empirical real-life data to define model parameters. As a result verification
of results can only be relegated to a comparison of epidemic parameters with the
COVID-19 pandemic and cannot completely verify the accuracy of the model.
7.2 Assumptions
As part of the consequence of using a bottom-up approach, much of our model is
founded on assumptions about human nature and their behavioral patterns. In order
to capture the mobility of individuals during a pandemic, we had to make assump-
tions about how often individuals leave their household and who is allowed to leave
the household. Furthermore, assumptions such as the number of community cen-
ters are very dependent on the specific use case. For instance, in our case study of
Cambria, we personally looked at the grocery stores and decided to use two as the
community centers in our model. Finally, assumptions about the disease are from
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recently published papers that may not have had time to pass a stringent peer review
due to the international push for study of the Covid-19 virus. Therefore, it is possi-
ble for assumptions about disease parameters such as infectiousness, viral load, and
incubation period to be incorrect.
7.3 Validation of Results
An important part of epidemiological studies is the validation of results. Many of our
related works validate their models by comparing their models’ results with real-world
data from the Covid-19 pandemic [18] [13] [46] [41]. In our case, our ABM was created
using just the community’s census numbers such as the population, mean population
per household, and the number of households. Everything else about our epidemic
model such as the infectiousness, mask infectiousness reduction, etc. are second-hand
data from other researchers and allowed to vary [35] [17]. Because of this, our model
allows for flexible experimentation but the wide assumptions results in non-specific
data that cannot be compared to real-world data as other epidemiological studies
have done. As a result, our model is limited to more general comparisons such as the
infected population and its dynamics over time. We provide a step towards validity




This thesis presented an Agent-Based Model (ABM) built on Python that was able to
simulate Covid-19 spread over a local community. We were able to simulate various
scenarios for intervention and prevention of disease spreading and observed its effect
on the amount of infected individuals. In particular, we found that quarantining as
a household, using masks, and restricting travel outside of households less than or
equal to 4 times a week was helpful in reducing the number of infected individuals. In
addition, we proposed future work that could help expand upon our ABM and make
our model more accurate for local communities.
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A.1 SIR Dynamics of Exit Factor 6 and Infectious Probability 0.2
Figure A.1: SIR Dynamics of Exit Factor 6 and Infectious Probability 0.2
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A.2 100% Quarantine compliance average total infected population when
households quarantine together
Raw data for total average infected population when households quarantine together
and 100% Quarantine compliance.
Infection Probability
Exit Factor
0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1 0.0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0
2 0.001 0.001 0.035 0.089 0.15
3 0.055 0.002 0.361 0.364 0.449
4 0.189 0.38 0.393 0.511 0.371
5 0.605 0.752 0.595 0.699 0.8
Table A.1: 100% Quarantine compliance average total infected population
A.3 90% Quarantine compliance average total infected population when
households quarantine together
Raw data for total average infected population when households quarantine together
and 90% Quarantine compliance.
Infection Probability
Exit Factor
0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1 0.0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0
2 0.002 0.012 0.073 0.157 0.083
3 0.301 0.159 0.288 0.353 0.34
4 0.34 0.418 0.525 0.386 0.46
5 0.589 0.597 0.999 0.5 0.9
Table A.2: 90% Quarantine compliance average total infected population
71
A.4 80% Quarantine compliance average total infected population when
households quarantine together
Raw data for total average infected population when households quarantine together
and 80% Quarantine compliance.
Infection Probability
Exit Factor
0.16 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1 0.0 0.001 0.001 0.0 0.001
2 0.001 0.109 0.104 0.11 0.113
3 0.267 0.283 0.299 0.287 0.359
4 0.394 0.328 0.317 0.358 0.493
5 0.498 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9




B.1 Empirical Data on effects of Covid-19 on Cambria
Data for the total amount of infections can be found in the San Luis Obispo County
Covid-19 dashboard [14]. As of June 2021, Cambria has had 185 cases of Covid-19.
A graph of the total infected population from June 2020 to around May 2020 can
be seen in Figure B.1. The spike in infections corresponds with the spike in overall
infections nationwide around January of 2021. Overall, Cambria has done well against
the infection with such a low total infected population. Unfortunately, we are not
able to see a delineation of cases by age group but the SLO Covid-19 dashboard does
provide information about the county’s cases delineated by age.
Figure B.1: Total infected population over time for Cambria
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